inevitable, there are still important questions left unanswered. The first set of questions pertains to timing: why were the long-standing vulnerabilities of the Arab states exposed now, and how had these defective states been able to survive for so long? The second set concerns the aspiring successor states. Why have the challengers to sovereignty taken the particular form that they have? Do any of them offer a chance for a more stable and peaceful political order?
The Arab struggle has taken place in a wider global context in which notions of statehood and sovereignty have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Domestic battles may have triggered the sudden collapse of Arab states, but changes at the regional and international levels created permissive conditions for political-opposition movements to destabilise existing states, manoeuvre toward statehood and potentially challenge the state system. Structural change at the global level made dramatic realignment at the state and regional levels possible. 4 Instability and uncertainty in the institutional rules of sovereignty affected the ways in which Arab states could respond to internal challengers, simultaneously hamstringing existing Arab states and emboldening their opposition.
The state and its competitors in the Arab world
Sovereignty, as the American political scientist Stephen Krasner famously put it, has always been a form of organised hypocrisy. 5 In part, this is because sovereignty is inextricable from international hierarchy. Sovereign states are presumed equal, but some are more equal than others. Acting self-interestedly and amorally, states exert power over others and often violate norms of sovereignty in pursuit of higher principles. 6 But hypocrisy stems also from the sheer girth of the concept itself. Sovereignty has multiple definitions, and many dimensions that are often incompatible. At the international level, sovereignty entails recognition and admission to the community of states. Once admitted, sovereignty provides for territorial inviolability and autonomy under international law. At the domestic level, sovereignty involves untrammelled control over specific territories and peoples. In other words, a sovereign state rules. Sovereignty is also closely tied to legitimacy. Particularly in a democratic age, sovereign states derive their legitimacy by embodying the popular will to self-rule.
7
In practice, the meaning of sovereignty has varied over time, and changed with the evolution of state practices. 8 In 1914, the noted international jurist Robert Lansing wrote that:
Political mastery depends upon the physical power to coerce … The legal right to exercise the supreme will over a community fail[s] to confer upon its legal possessor a real supremacy, unless the possessor of the physical power permits such exercises. President Woodrow Wilson himself came to Paris with a radically different agenda, calling for a system of sovereignty premised on national self-determination, derived from international law, and adjudicated and enforced by international society through the League of Nations. 10 Lansing would eventually resign in disgust. This post-war moment marked the beginning of a critical period of uncertainty and fluidity in which the institutions of sovereignty would undergo drastic revision. By 1945, the rules of sovereignty had changed, but so too had its judges. 11 Sovereignty was conferred, not possessed as Lansing had posited. Sovereign states could therefore be formed by the initiative of the international community in collaboration with the population itself. Seemingly primitive peoples could be tutored until ready for self-governance. The sovereign states would then represent the will of the people. 12 The elimination of recognised states from the system was prohibited; territorial integrity was ensured not just by a national army in defence of the state, but by the international community as a whole in defence of a system.
13
American ascent was crucial to the solidification of the mid-twentieth- 29 The institutional organs of surveillance and violence, the secret police and the army, remained the mainstays of stability and governance, making Arab states fierce but weak.
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In sum, securing internal order was less a matter of negotiation than of imposition, and remained accordingly fragile.
Nearly every de jure Arab state had at least one counter-state lurking in its shadow. These aspiring players pointed to the inconsistency between promise and practice. They claimed to correct the historical mistakes of the past and promised a more just, stable and legitimate form of statehood. 
Global dissensus and regional ramifications

36
The changes in Yemen were a small part of a contentious and much larger transformation in the rules of sovereignty. Iran, like Nigeria, South Africa and other would-be regional powers, saw the opportunity to exert its own hegemonic designs in the Middle East, starting with Iraq, putting further stress on fragmented regional order.
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Accompanying changes in the international system were technological developments that promised to change how power could be generated and projected. 54 From drone strikes to cyber attacks to financial warfare, new instruments of power transcended territorial boundaries. 55 Unlike the atom bomb, or the dreadnought before that, these capabilities were not confined to a handful of states but became widely accessible to actors in the interna- to protect the president. 57 Moreover, the army, police and intelligence services harboured their own institutional agendas regarding access to money and power, which overrode the duty to defend the leader at all costs. 
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There are even reports of ISIS-issued currency. 75 Oil smuggling provides
ISIS looks
and acts the state a significant revenue stream. Engineers and technocrats oversee the subsidisation and distribution of water, electricity, foodstuffs and gasoline.
A skeletal welfare system offers healthcare and pensions for mujahideen and their dependents. 76 In fact, polemicists specifically highlight the superiority of the Islamic State's welfare provision to that of the Gulf regimes.
77
Internally, ISIS functions normally -at least by regional standards -even as it purports to revive a mediaeval Islamic empire. Like other revolutionary states before it, 78 ISIS thumbs its nose at international law but appeals directly to the (Muslim) masses for recognition and legitimation. The more migrants, recruits, followers and financial backers the Islamic State's propaganda attracts, the more legitimate its claim to embody the caliphate. ISIS. In all of these cases, though, the appeal to outside powers to shore up internal control came at the cost of ultimate diminution within the global and regional hierarchy of states.
States have also made appeals abroad to funnel economic resources into particular 'useable' spaces within the rump state. 80 As peripheral zones like Sinai and Upper Egypt, the Sahel, and the Jazeera and Syrian deserts slipped from the state's grip, heavily fortified capitals (and Erbil, a de facto capital) 81 experienced real-estate bubbles and construction booms catalysed by an inflow of international aid and foreign direct investment. In the Maghreb, state authorities clung to the coastal cities and hunkered down
Assad has wielded norms of sovereign immunity
around the far-flung oil fields and mineral deposits, pipelines and petrochemical facilities in the interior. Egypt announced intentions to build an entirely new capital city, funded by Gulf investors, somewhere in the desert east of Cairo. Tellingly, the plan was unveiled at a well-guarded south Sinai beach resort, while the peninsula's interior regions became a redoubt for smugglers, criminals and terrorists.
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In Iraq and Syria, the focus on useable space amounts to a retreat to defensible boundaries. Iraqi plans to retake Mosul from the Islamic State seem to have been postponed indefinitely. 83 Yet Iraq's southern oil fields, which hold nine-tenths of the country's reserves, produce at full tilt, attracting billions in foreign investment. The arrival of internally displaced people and the relocation of financial capital to government-controlled territories precipitated runs in the housing market, a boon for regime-aligned profiteers. 84 In Syria, the military and political situation is even more tenuous.
In July 2015, Assad stressed the importance of Syrian independence and criticised Western powers that sought to re-impose 'imperialism' on the Syrian people by backing international 'terrorists'. 'Each part of Syria is precious and invaluable', he said, but 'war has its conditions, strategies, and priorities'. Accordingly, 'vital areas must be held as to prevent other areas from falling', while less important regions, particularly where the population appeared to side with the rebels, would be effectively vacated. 85 Considering the historical record and the current catastrophic violence, 'good enough' may be a worthy goal.
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Admittedly, some of these scenarios may today appear far-fetched. Yet a mere five years ago, the suggestion that Egypt would have experienced two changes of regime or that Tunisia would be in the midst of a democratic transition would also have seemed preposterous. 103 The purposeful designs of any single actor in the Middle East, whether state or non-state, regional or great power, will not be enough to reshape the map of sovereignty and statehood. This many-sided, multilayered battle for sovereignty will yield political structures of unforeseen form and stature.
